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Nearly one third of the cases upon which the Supreme Court
rendered written opinions in its 1937 term involved controversies
over taxes. They constituted by long odds the largest single group
of cases to have travelled the long road of litigation culminating in
the deliberations of the highest court. The result has been not only
a substantial addition to the already ponderous mass of tax law but
the clarification of certain problems left open by previous decisions.
There remain to be solved, however, not only many old problems
but also a number of new ones growing out of the latest opinions.
The difficulties ahead, together with the present maze of tax decisions, warrant taking an inventory of what the court has accomplished in the past year and charting whatever trends seem definite
enough to play a part in the consideration of future problems.
Those cases dealing with intergovernmental tax immunity will
not be discussed here, as they constitute a separate problem to be
dealt with by Mr. Rottschaefer. Apart from them, decisions of
great importance have been made on the restrictive effect of the
commerce clause, the Fourteenth Amendment and the impairment
of contracts clause upon state taxation, the implicatio-s' of tfie Sixteenth Amendment, and the construction and application of various
provisions of the federal revenue laws.
COMMERCE CLAUSE

Although not abandoning the usual and frequently formalistic
methods of approach the court in several opinions has used language
that may well presage the future abandonment of old rules and the
application of a new test to determine whether or not a state tax
violates the commerce clause. Under this test certain elements
which have in the past been regarded as part of the pattern if not
the fabric of interstate commerce will not be entitled to exemnption
from a non-discriminatory state tax even though their taxation
admittedly increases the cost of carrying on interstate commerce so
long as sustaining the tax will not lead to multiple state taxation.
Western Livestock v. Burean of Revenue 2 is probably the most
important case of the last term pointing in this new direction. The
New Mexico tax before the court in that case was imposed upon the
business of publishing newspapers and magazines and was measured
by gross receipts from advertising. The advertising contracts were
1 As early as 1867 in Steamship Company v. Portwardens, 6 Wall. (73
U. S.) 31, the court recognized that a forbidden burden on interstate commerce might result if a fee were imposed upon every ship entering the port
of New Orleans, as a similar fee might then be exacted at every port of call.
2 (1938) 58 Sup. Ct. 546.
See comments (1938) 86 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
787; (1938) 13 Indiana L. J. 500.
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made with advertisers in other states and necessitated the interstate
transmission of advertising materials from advertiser to publisher 3
and the gross receipts from advertising were greater by reason of
the publisher's maintenance of an interstate circulation of the magazine containing the advertisements. The court assumed in favor of
the taxpayer that the advertising contracts required the publisher to
maintain this interstate circulation.
The tax was upheld, the first ground being that " providing and
selling advertising space in a publication," was a local business distinct from the business of circulating the publication. 4 The court
found sufficient authority for its holding in American Manufacturing
Company v. St. Louis,5 which sustained a state tax upon manufacturing measured by total sales most of which were in interstate
commerce. 6 The court also upheld the tax on the ground that,
unlike the tax sustained in the American Manufacturing Company
case, it did not include in its measure the gross receipts from goods
- It was held " the tax . . . is not forbidden either because the contract,
apart from its performance, is within the protection of the commerce clause,
or because as an incident preliminary to printing and publishing the advertisements the advertizers send cuts, copy and the like to appellants." It is
well established that the mere formation of a contract between persons in
different states is not within the protection of the commerce clause. See
Paul v. Virginia (1868) 8 Wall. 75 (U. S.) 168, and other cases cited by
the court. A more difficult problem arises when articles must be transported
preliminary to performing a contract, such interstate movement from buyer
to seller being necessary to the performance of the contract.
4It has been suggested that as the business taxed was printing and publishing and as publishing included notification of persons outside the taxing
state, the case was governed by Fisher's Blend Station v. Tax Commissioner
(1936) 297 U. S. 650. See 86 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 787. The court, however,
viewed the tax as " conditioned on the carrying on of a local business, that
of providing and selling advertizing space in a published journal." If this
view, which is not clearly apparent from the language of the taxing statute
set forth in a footnote to the opinion, is tenable, the tax can be distinguished
from the tax on radio broadcasting invalidated in the Fisher's Blend case.
5 (1919) 250 U. S. 459.
6 Once a local privilege has been defined there remains the Droblem of
measuring its value. Where the privilege is that of producing something,
its value may be measured by the number of things produced over a given
period of time. Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost (1932) 286 U. S. 16.5,
production of electricity measured by amount generated; Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co. (1938) 58 Sup. Ct. 736, production of
power measured by horse-power of producing engine. The privilege may
also be measured by the value of the things produced over that period.
Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord (1923) 262 U. S. 172, production of ore
measured by value of the ore mined. Amongst the criteria of the value of
a thing is its sale price. Thus gross sales, reflecting as they do the value.
of that which is sold, are an appropriate measure of the value of the privilege of producing that which is sold. Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall (1926)
274 U. S. 284, production of gas, measured by gross receipts from sales of
the gas produced; American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis (1919) 250 U. S. 459,
production of goods measured by gross receipts from sales of the goods
produced.
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sold in interstate commerce. The burden on interstate commerce
resulting from taxing receipts from advertising even though augmented by interstate circulation, was considered too remote to affect
the validity of the tax, the inference being that gross receipts from
advertising are taxable independently of a local privilege.
Perhaps the greatest interest attaches to the court's "'added
reason " for sustaining the New Mexico tax, namely, that in so far
as the additional value of gross advertising receipts resulting from
interstate circulation is taxed by New Mexico " it cannot again be
taxed elsewhere any more than the value of railroad property taxed
locally." Whatever interstate commerce might be involved in the
business taxed, therefore, could not be jeopardized by cumulative
burdens.
This added reason coupled with the court's emphasis on the fact
that interstate commerce is not wholly exempt from state taxation
but must pay its way,7 together with the court's striking declaration
that the reason for invalidating state taxes on gross receipts from
interstate commerce and other interstate values is to prevent discrimination against interstate commerce resulting from multi-stater
taxation of the same values,8 suggests that it rnolonger
cessary
to find a local privilege to uphold a tax on gross receipts from
interstate commerce where multi-state taxation of these gross receipts is impossible.
This suggestion is fortified by the decision in Adams Manufactur-ing Co. v. Storen.9 This case involved the Indiana gross income
tax as applied to gross receipts from interstate sales. The tax on
such receipts was invalidated, not on the grounds that they are immune from state taxation except where the tax is merely the equivalent of a tax on property or some other subject within the jurisdiction of the state, but on the ground that such receipts were taxed
without apportionment.10 Such a tax if upheld would result in
" Itwas not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged
in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden even though
it increases the cost of doing the business. 'Even interstate commerce
must pay its way.'" 58 Sup. Ct. at 548.
8 "The vice characteristic of those which have been held invalid is that
they have placed on commerce burdens of such a nature as to be capable
in point of substapce of being imposed or added to with equal right by
every state which the commerce touches merely because interstate commerce
is being done, . . . It is for these reasons that a state may not lay a tax
measured by the amount of merchandise carried in interstate commerce, or
upon the freight earned by its carriage." 58 Sup. Ct. at 548-9.
9 (1938) 58 Sup. Ct. 913. The probable bearing of the Western Livestock case upon, the decision in this case is discussed in (1938) 13 Indiana
L. J. 5oo.
10 " The vice of the statute as applied to receipts from interstate
sales is
that the tax includes in its measure, without apportionment, receipts derived
from activities in interstate commerce." 58 Sup. Ct. 913, 916.
" It is because the tax, forbidden as to interstate commerce, reaches indis-
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discrimination against interstate commerce as other states in which
the'commerce is carried on could with equal right tax the same gross
receiptst he plain inference to be drawn from the case, in line
with the Western Livestock case, is that if the tax had been so
apportioned as to avoid the possibility of a cumulative burden resulting from mtilti-state taxation of the same gross receipts, it would
have been valid. Thus, just as a state may tax net income from
interstate commerce fairly attributable to the state so may it tax
the tax is not
gross receipts fairly attributable thereto even though
on a local privilege or in lieu of a property tax. 1 '
A discussion of the above cases would not be complete without
some mention of the vigorous dissenting opinion of Mr.' Justice
Black in the Storen case. He protested the " unfair and discriminatory burden " which in his view was imposed by the court's decision
upon those engaged in local commerce, and contrasted the cases
upholding taxes nominally imposed upon a local subject or property
but measured by gross receipts from interstate commerce. He
reasoned that as Congress had the exclusive power to regulate
interstate commerce and, therefore, could protect such commerce
from undue and unfair burdens, the court went beyond its province
in invalidating a state tax because it might in some hypothetical
future have resulted in multiple burdens on interstate commerce.
Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. Tax Commission 12 involved the
-Validity of a Washington occupation tax measured by gross receipts,
as applied to a domestic corporation engaged in a general stevedoring business but serving only vessels engaged exclusively in interstate and foreign commerce. The great mass of the taxpayer's business consisted of loading and unloading vessels by longshoremen
working under the taxpayer's direction and control. In a few instances the taxpayer simply supplied longshoremen to shipowners
without directing or controlling their work. Although the business
here taxed was a " general stevedoring business," the court treated
it as a business of two kinds.13 The business of loading and unloadcriminately and without apportionment, the gross compensation for both
interstate commerce and intrastate activity that it must fail in its entirety
so far as applied to receipts from sales interstate." 58 Sup. Ct. 913, 917.
11 This inference raises the question as to what sort of an apportionment
would have satisfied the court. See Hump Hairpin Mfg. Co. v. Emmerson
(1922) 258 U. S. 290 and Western Cartridge Co. v. Emmerson (1930) 281
U.S. 511, where under an allocation formula based upon property and
business, interstate sales were attributable to the state of manufacture.
From the language of the court in the Storen case it seems apparent that
it would insist upon an allocation between the state of origin and the state
of destination for it called attention to the fact that the -tax if sustained
could be imposed with equal right by the state of origin and the state of
destination thus exposing the same gross receipts to double taxation.
12 (1937)
58 Sup. Ct. 72.
13 Compare Ficklen v. Shelby County Taxing District (1892) 145 U. S. I,
cited with approval in the Western Livestock v. Bureau of Revenue (1938)
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ing interstate and foreign vessels was held to be interstate and
foreign commerce which the state could not "tax the privilege of
doing by exacting in return therefor a percentage of the gross
receipts." The business of supplying longshoremen to shipowners
without directing or controlling their work was held to be a local
business subject to a tax measured by gross receipts.
The decision invalidating the tax based on gross receipts from
interstate commerce even though the business was of such a character that multi-state taxation was impossible 14 can be reconciled
with the implications in the Western Livestock and Storen cases on
the ground that the tax involved was a privilege tax. Thus the
decision is in line with the cases like Alpia Portland Cement Co.
v. Massachusetts15 holding that a state may not exact a tax for the
privilege of carrying on interstate commerce, a privilege which it
does not grant, regardless of the measure.
Thus, legalistic reasoning is still employed to justify on the one
hand, a tax even though cumulative burdens are possible provided
the tax is called a privilege tax and is imposed upon a local privilege,
and to invalidate on the other hand, taxes which are imposed upon
the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce although there is
no possibility of a cumulative burden on that commerce.
The Louisiana tax before the court in Coverdale v. Arkansas
Louisiana Pipe Line Company 16 was not imposed upon gross
receipts, but upon the privilege of producing power measured by
the horse power of the "prime mover " or power-producing machine.
In order to get natural gas to the pressure necessary to transport it
through interstate pipe lines a company used compressors operated
by engines. The court upheld a tax on the company for the privilege of producing power by these engines. It stated that the production of power was a local activity just as generation of electrical
energy was in Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost.'7

--

*

58 Sup. Ct. 546. There a tax of $50.00 plus two and one-half percent of
gross commissions was upheld as applied to merchants engaged in a general
commission business, with the bulk of their commissions resulting from
interstate sales. This case has been criticized and distinguished, but never
overruled. See Brennan v. Titusville (1894) 153 U. S. 289; Crew Levick
v. Pennsylvania (1917) 245 U. S. 292 and Stockard v. Morgan (1902) 185
U. S. 27. See also Raley and Bros. v. Richardson (1924) 264 U. S. 157,
where a flat tax on commission merchants was held inapplicable to merchants doing wholly interstate business, but properly applicable to those
doing both intrastate and interstate business. The court remarked that
"tone cannot avoid a tax upon a taxable business by also engaging in a
non-taxable business."
14 The gross receipts from loading and unloading interstate vessels would
not be taxable by any other state nor does it seem that they would constitute the measure of a tax that might be imposed by the state of origin or
destination of the cargo unloaded or loaded.
L5 (1925) 268 U. S. 203.&c4z"

16 (1938)

17 (1932)

58 Sup. Ct. 736.
286 U. S. 165.
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In this respect the case is striking in contrast with Helson V.
Kentucky,1s holding invalid a state tax as applied to the use of
gasoline in operating a ferry boat running between two states. The
Helson case and others were distinguished on the ground that they
involved, in the words of the court, "taxes on interstate commerce
and its instrumentalities rather than on operations closely connected
with but distinct from that commerce." The tenuous nature of this
distinction may indicate a reluctance on the part of the court to
apply the rule of the Helson case. As in the Western Livestock
case, the court was not content to dispose of the case solely on
precedent but pointed out that the tax could be imposed by only one
state, namely, the state in which the engines were located. It recognized that two states might tax the production of power, if engines
connected with the same pipe line were located in several states,
but stated that such multiple state taxation would result from
"length of line, not interstate commerce."
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

Concerned as the court has been in the recent cases just discussed
to protect interstate commerce from the possibilities of multiple
state taxation, it has shown no comparable anxiety over similar
possibilities presented by the ad valorem taxation of intangibles.
The court, for example, in Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania '" sanctioned the ad valorem taxation of corporate
shares held by a non-resident, even though the same stock might
n accord with previous decisions, 2 0
also be taxed in another state.
it also held that the state need not allow any exemption equivalent
to the value of the shares attributable to the corporation's ownership
of federal securities, other than national bank shares, so long as it
did not discriminate against such securities in computing the tax
base.2 ' Relying on Corry v. Baltimore,22 the court rejected the
suggested distinction that in the instant case the act declaring the
liability of the shares of non-residents, did not antedate the charter
of the corporation nor provide that the situs of the shares should
be in the state of the corporate domicile. It pointed out that for
many years before the granting, of the charter the state constitution
contained a reserved right to alter and amend, so that every stockholder acquired his shares with full knowledge that they could be
18

(1929)

19 (938)

279

U.

S.

245.

58 Sup. Ct. 295.

20 Van Allen v. Assessors (1866) 3 Wall. (70 U. S.) 573; National Bank
v. Commonwealth (1869) 9 Wall. (76 U. S.) 353; Cleveland Trust Co. v.
Lander (1902)
(1923)

184 U.

S. iii;

Des Moines Nat. Bank v. Fairweather

263 U. S. 103.

21 See the decision rendered on the previous appeal of this case (1935)

296 U. S. 113.
22 (1905) 196 U. S. 466.
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subjected to regulation and taxation. The court reasoned that as a
share of stock represents an aliquot proportion of corporate assets 23
and depended on the law of the corporation's state of domicile for
protection and preservation, it was within the taxing jurisdiction
of that state, even though the ownership of the stock might also be
a taxable subject in another state under the doctrine of First Bank
Corporation v. Minnesota.2 4
The case apparently supports the proposition that nothing in the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits multiple ad valorem taxation of
intangibles. While not over-ruling either Farmers Loan & Trust
Co. v. Minnesota 25 or First National Bank v. Maine,2 6 it strips
those cases of implications respecting property taxation and limits
them to the field of death taxation. The dictum of Mr. Justice
Stone in First Bank Stock Corp. v. Minnesota,27 that intangibles
can have no location in space and that the fiction of mobilia sequuntur personam cannot be used to exempt an owner of intangibles
from contribution to costs of government in return for benefits
bestowed by a state, becomes the elegy of a doctrine long regarded
as far-reaching in scope even after it had been excluded from income
taxation in Cohn v. Graves 25 and Whitney v. Graves.29
The rule against multi-state taxation of intangibles is not inexorable even in the field of death taxation to which it is now restricted,
as the well-known Dorrance litigation 30 graphically demonstrates.
While domicile in legal theory exists in but one jurisdiction, it may
in legal fact exist in several. A year ago the committee of the
National Tax Association on double domicile in inheritance taxation
looked for some solution of the dilemma in the settlement of certain
cases then pending before the United States Supreme Court.3 ' The
court's recent decision in one of those cases, Worcester County
Trust Co. v. Riley,3 2 rejected a practical solution which would have
23 Cf. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Doughton
69; see comment, (1927) I5 Calif. L. Rev. 248.
24 (937)
30 U. S. 234.
25 (930)
280 U. S. 204, A. L. R. Tooo.
26 (1932)
27

284 U. S. 3A2, 77 A. L. R.

(1926)

270 U. S.

4oi.

Supra note 24, at 241.
28 (1937) 300 U. S. 308.
29 (937)
299 U. S. 366.
30 In re Dorrance's Estate

(1932)

309 Pa. 151, 163 Atl. 303, cert. denied,

Dorrance v. Pennsylvania (1932) 287 U. S. 66o; In re Estate of Dorrance
(934) 115 N. J. Eq. 268, 170 AtI. 6oi, cert. denied (3936) 298 U. S. 678;
New Jersey v. Pennsylvania (1933) 287 U. S. 58o; Hill v. Martin (1935)
296 U. S. 393. Notes (932)
8I Pa. L. Rev. 177; (933)
18 Minn. L.
Rev. 737; (934) 34 Col. L. Rev. 1151.
31 In addition to the Riley case the Committee called attention to Texas
v. New York et al., wherein the Supreme Court appointed a master to take
testimony and report.
32(937) 58 Sup. Ct. i85.
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made possible determination of the disputed fact of domicile by the
independent federal judiciary.
The Federal Interpleader Act 33 gives the Federal District Court
original jurisdiction in interpleader petitions " filed by any person
.

.

. having . . . money or property .-. . if two or more adverse

claimants, citizens of different states are claiming to be entitled to
such money or property." 3
The executor of a decedent attempted
under this act to interplead the tax officials of Massachusetts and
California, as both states were claiming death transfer taxes upon
the transfer of the same intangibles.
The court held that the suit was in substance one against the
State of California and hence forbidden by the Eleventh Amendment.35 The court distinguished between suits against state officials
enforcing unconstitutional state statutes, to which the federal judicial
power extends notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment, 36 and
suits against state officials, enforcing state statutes constitutional on
their face which are in effect suits against " one of the United
States " and beyond the federal judicial power. It pointed out that
under the California statutes the tax would be imposed only if it
were judicially determined that the decedent had been domiciled in
California and it was not contended that the California officials were
taxing independently of the judgment of a court.3 7 Even if both
Massachusetts and California courts had found the decedent domiciled in their respective states there would in the court's opinion
have been no violation of due process as the Fourteenth Amendment
does not protect against inconsistent or erroneous state court
decisions.'
Earlier in First National Bank of Boston v. Maine," the court
took the position that " intangibles constitutionally can be subjected
to a death tax by one state only." " It has been forced to deviate
33 Section 24 (26) of the Judicial Code as amended; 49 Stat. 1o96 (28)
U. S. C. A. sec. 41 (26).

3 Ibid.
35 "The judicial power . . . shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by citizens of another state."
"6 The court recognized that under Ex parte Young (1908) 209 U. S.
123, the Eleventh Amendment is no bar to a suit against a state official
acting without legal authority. This was not the situation in the instant
case, where the state official's acts did not involve any breach of state law
or of the United States Constitution.
37 The fact that the state statutes did not impose death taxes on a nondomiciliary basis as they did in First National Bank v. Maine (932) 284

U. S. 312, and .Farmers

Loan and Trust Co. v. Minn. (1930)

280 U.

S.

204, cleared them of any unconstitutionality. The California Act afforded
opportunity for a judicial determination of the question of domicile, so that
at most there could be a conflict of court decisions only on the fact-question
of domicile, a conflict not " forestalled " by the United States Constitution.
38 (1932)

284 U. S. 312.

P9 Ibid. at 328.
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from this position by the recognition that multiple state death transfer taxation of intangibles in the double domicile cases is beyond the
reach of federal constitutional prohibitions. 40 The eventual solution
may lie, as suggested in the Third Report of the Committee of the
National Tax Association, 4 ' in interstate compacts or reciprocal
legislation between states.
The due process clause has been involved as well as the commerce
clause in the cases turning on the distinction between a privilege
fee and a tax. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Virginia4 2 calls attention
to the distinction between the two in their application to foreign
corporations. The state exacted from a foreign corporation an
entrance fee for the privilege of doing intrastate business, varying
according to the authorized capital stock of the corporation but not
to exceed $5,000 for corporations having an authorized capital of
more than $90,000,000. The appellant corporation paid the maximum fee. The court held it constitutional, relying on two previous
decisions involving the constitutionality of the same statutes.4 3 Its
intervening decision in Cudahy Packing Company v. Hinkle,4 4 however, made necessary an extended discussion of the reasons for
distinguishing that case.
The court assumed at the outset that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions might be invoked for conditions to be fulfilled
wholly before admission.4 5 It pointed out, however, that an entrance fee, as the sale price of the privilege of doing local business,
constitutes a non-recurring charge, analogous to the charter or
incorporation fee of a domestic corporation, which may be fixed in
any manner the state sees fit to adopt. It went on to state that
"even if the United States Constitution conferred 'upon every corporation the right to enter any State and carry on there a local
business upon paying a reasonable fee, there is nothing in the record
to show that the $5,000 charged is more than reasonable compensation for the privilege granted." As the amount of the fee bore no
relation either to the volume of interstate business or the amount of
40 The court seems to recognize that double domicile cases result from
conflicting decisions of the courts of different states " upon the same issues
of fact,". and that differences in proof and the latitude necessarily allowed
to the trier of fact in each case to weigh and draw inferences from evidence
and to pass upon the credibility of witnesses, might lead an appellate court
to conclude that in none is the judgment erroneous." 58 Sup. Ct. at 188.
41 (1938) Proceedings of the National Tax Association, p. 453.
42 (937)
58 Sup. Ct. 75. See comment (1938) 24 Va. L. Rev. 326.
4 General Ry. Signal Co. v. Virginia (1918) 246 U. S. 5oo; Western
Gas Construction Co. v. Virginia (1928) 276 U. S. 597, affirming per curiam

(1927) 147 Va. 235, 136 S. E. 646.
4 (1929) 278 U. S. 460.

4 See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas (1910)
Burke Construction Co. (1922) 257 U. S. 529.

216 U. S. i;

Terral v.
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property outside the state and was not arbitrarily fixed, 4 6 the fee
was held not to violate either the commerce clause or the due process
clause.
The same considerations with respect to the commerce and due
process clauses were disregarded in Cudahy Packing Co. v. Hinkle,17
but the court distinguished that case on the ground that there
the corporation had previously entered the state with permission to
do local business, and pursuant to that permission had acquired
property and made expenditures. Whatever was imposed after the
admission of the corporation was regarded by the court as a tax
rather than a filing fee. The distinction is theoretical, for a filing
fee measured by total authorized stock imposes the same literal
" burden " as does a tax measured in the same manner. The burden
in the Atlantic Refining case was legitimatized by being anticipated,
while the burden in the Cudahy case, being a sequel rather than
a prelude to admission, violated not only the commerce but the due
process clause. The burden remained the same regardless of its
name, but its validity was materially affected by the time at which
it was imposed. The court found no discrimination between appellant corporation and domestic corporations. Citing Hanover Fire
Insurance Co. v. Harding,8 it states that the appellant in any event
could not invoke the equal protection clause as it had not yet been
admitted to do business in the state.
The case of Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson 49
illustrates that the measure of an excise tax, as distinguished from
an admission fee, must bear some integral relation to the activities
carried on by a foreign corporation within the taxing state. California imposed a tax upon the gross premiums received by insurance
companies on contracts entered into outside the state with other
insurance companies authorized to do business in California, reinsuring the latter companies against loss on policies of life insurance
executed by them in California. The state contended that the reinsurance transactions were so related to business carried on by the
company in California as to be a part of it, and that in any event
no injustice was done as the state could have exacted a tax from
the original insurers instead of allowing them to deduct from the
measure of their tax liability the amount of reinsurance premiums
paid by them to companies authorized to do business in the state. 5 0
46 The court pointed out that the value of the privilege was dependent
upon the financial resources of the corporation, of which the authorized
capital stock was some indication. Cf. Airway Electric Appliance Corp. v.
Day (1924) 266 U. S. 71.
7 (1929) 278 U. S. 460.
48 (1926)
272 U. S. 494, 49 A. L. R. 713.
4 (1938)
58 Sup. Ct. 436. See comment (1938) 86 U. of Pa. L. Rev.

543, 554.

50 Following the court's decision in the instant case the California Legislature proposed a constitutional amendment )(d
b
,

~4

13
The court denied the validity of these contentions, pointing out that
" the reinsurance involved no transactions or relationship between
[the company] and those originally insured, and called for no act
in California." The decisive factor was said to be the state's power
to control the objects of the tax. Had the contracts of reinsurance
involved any action in California, such as the settlement and adjustment of claims, the inclusion of the reinsurance premiums in the
measure of the tax might have been valid. 5 '
In Breedlove v. Suttles .2 the court sustained a Georgia Poll
Tax 53 against the claim that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment
in favoring persons under twenty-one years of age, over sixty years
of age and women not desiring to vote.5 4 The fact that the state
constitution made payment of poll taxes a prerequisite to voting,55
and the fact that women desiring to vote are required to pay current
taxes only, 56 were held not to constitute a violation of the Nineteenth
Amendment. The court found a reasonable basis for the exemption
accorded to t several classes, even implying that failure to classify
57
"ig renderthe tax invalid.
Hale v. Iowa State Board of Assessment aid Review 5 added
another page to the story of taxation of non-taxables. The case
a.t--the-genecnunder
which the taxes on insurance
companies will be measured by the gross premiums " other than premiums
for reinsurance" received from business done within the state. As no deduction will be allowed for premiums paid for reinsurance in other companies, the net result will be to include in the measure of the tax premiums
upon all direct writings with respect to California business regardless of
reinsurance contracts.
51 Cf. Palmetto Fire Insurance Company v. Connecticut (1926) 272 U. S.
295; Compania de Tabacos v. Collector (1927) 275 U. S. 87.
52 (937)
58 Sup. Ct. 205.
5 Georgia Code 1933, sections 92-108.
54 It was pointed out that the tax upon minors would in effect be upon
the fathers liable for their support, and that men over sixty are normally
relieved of numerous public duties. The exemption of women was justified
as a recognition of the special burdens they bear. " Moreover," the court
said, " Georgia poll taxes are laid to raise money for educational purposes,
and it is the father's duty to provide for education of the children."
55 There is nothing in the United States Constitution that would seem to
prohibit the conditioning of the right to vote on the payment of taxes. The
court approved of the condition as an aid to tax collection.
56 As women could be exempt from the tax altogether, the requirement
that women desirous of voting must pay current taxes makes for equality
for voting purposes.
57 In Salt Lake City v. Wilson, 46 Utah 6o, 148 Pac. 1104, cited by the
court, the hardships that would result from imposing a poll tax upon all
inhabitants without classification, were recognized. The court in that case
said that "the Legislature must deviate to some extent from any such
Procrustean standard of equality as this."
58 (1938) 58 Sup. Ct. 102.
See Comments (1938) 26 Geo. L. J. 485;
(0938) 23 Iowa L. Rev. 273; (1q38) 86 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 318; (1938)
24 Va. L. Rev. 332; (1938) 12 Tulane L. Rev. 422.
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involved the application of the Iowa net income tax to interest from
bonds declared by Iowa statutes to be exempt from all taxation. As
these statutes had once been part and parcel of the ad valorem tax
statutes, the Iowa court held that they exempted the bonds from
property taxes only. It went on to hold that the income tax was
not a property tax, and could, therefore, properly be applied to
interest from bonds.
The Supreme Court, citing the division of authority in the state
cases as to whether or not an income tax is a property tax,59 and
also citing its own decisions, including New York ex rel. Cohn v.
Graves,6 o on the nature of net income taxes, held that there was
nothing unreasonable in the decision of the Iowa court. It pointed
out that as Iowa did not have income taxes when its ad valorem
tax statutes were passed, the legislature could not have intended to
include income taxes in the exemption.
The same point arose in Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen 61 with respect
to the Indiana gross income tax, and the tax was held valid on the
authority of the Hale case. Here again the history of the statute
lent conviction to the theory that its exemption provision was intended to cover only property taxes and such other taxes as were
known when the statute was passed.
IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS CLAUSE

Several attempts were made, all unsuccessful, to defeat state taxation by invoking the impairment of contracts clause of the Constitution. I addition to the c tention n the ale cas 62t
the state net i ome ta was a operty tax d t re ore ot'p icwas ar
in i1 cas that
able to int rest on exem
b ds,
the statu exem ting the
nds cre ed a co act be een ondholders nd the st te. On
assumpt n th/ta ont act"'
exist,
the co t held that it did nt e tend to th i erest
the b ; ds."'
In New York Rapid Transit Corporation v. The City of New
York, 6 4 a tax on utilities of 3% of their gross receipts designated for
relief purposes was protested by the plaintiff utility which operated
rapid transit railroads in the City of New York under contract
with the City. The contract provided for a five-cent fare, which
could be increased only by a majority vote of the people, and for a
so See Brown, Nature of the Income Tax (1933) 17 Minn. L. Rev. 127;
Traynor and Keesling, The Scope and Nature of the California Income Tax
(1936) 24 Calif. L. Rev. 493.
60 (1937) 300 U. S. 308.
61 (1938)
62

58 Sup. Ct. 913.

Supra, note

63 It

W

5

was decided that even if the state statute exempting bonds from
taxation created a contract, the state court's determination that the contract
was limited to property taxes was not unreasonable.
64 (1938) 58 Sup. Ct. 721, petition for rehearing denied, 58 Sup.
Ct. 939.
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pooling of the gross receipts from operation and a division between
the utility and city after the deduction of pecific items. The plaintiff challenged the validity of the tax on te grounds that it impaired
the obligation of its contract with the city and violated its rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
As the contract contained no express exemption from taxes of
any kind, the court held that the tax did not impair the contract,
citing the principle that any surrender of the taxing power must be
made in clear and unmistakable language, 5 and vetoing the suggestion that the imposition of the tax violated the provision of the
contract as to the allocation of revenue.
In discussing the relevance of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
court, in line with its decisions at the previous term,6 6 held that
there need be no relationship between the taxpayer and the purpose
for which the money was spent. United States v. Butler,6 7 which
held invalid the tax imposed under the Agricultural Adjustment
Act, was distinguished on the ground that it was part of an unconstitutional scheme to regulate production through expenditures.
THE FEDERAL INCOME

rThe

TAXABLE INCOME

Supreme Court in its last term added substantially to the

case law on the meaning of income under the Sixteenth Amendment.
Helvering v. Gowran,6 8 perhaps the most important of these cases,
removed much of the uncertainty left by the Koshland case 69 with
65 58 Sup. Ct. at 730.

66 Carmichael v. Southern Coal and Coke Co. (937)
301 U. S. 495;
Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States (1937) 301 U. S. 308.
87 (1936) 297 U. S. I.
68 (1937)

58 Sup. Ct. 154.

See comments,

(1938)

38 Col. L, Rev. 363;

(1938) 26 Geo. L. J. 500; (1938) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 744; (1938) 36 Mich.
L. Rev. 673; (1938) 86 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 441. See also, Helvering v.
Pfeiffer (1937) 58 Sup. Ct. 159. Helvering v. Gowran adds to the restrictions on Eisner v. Macomber (1920) 252 U. S. 189, which began with
Rockefeller v. U.

S.

(1921)

257 U. S.

176,

U. S. v. Phellis

(1921)

257

U. S. 156, Cullinan v. Walker (1923) 262 U. S. 134, and Marr v. U. S.
(1925) 268 U. S. 536. Cf. Weiss v. Stearn (1924) 265 U. S. 242.
The
next step was taken in Koshland v. Helvering (1936) 298 U. S. 441, where
the taxpayer, taking her cue from the reorganization cases, asserted that
when she received a common stock dividend on preferred shares she received a different proportionate interest in the corporation, which was income to her on receipt. In sustaining this contention, the court apparently
scuttled the requirement, upon which Eisner v. Macomber was partly based,
that a stockholder must receive some of the corporate assets before he can
be taxed as having received income. The Koshland case did not decide,
however, just how different the proportions must be before the receipt of
the new interest could be income. The problem is clarified to some extent
by the Gowran case.
69 Supra, note 68.
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respect to stock dividends. The court held that a preferred stock
dividend, paid to a common stockholder of a corporation with preferred stock outstanding, was constitutionally taxable as income, on
the ground that it sufficiently changed the proportionate interest of
the common stockholder by giving him new rights to share in the
profits, or assets on liquidation, if the corporation were unable to
pay the preferred shareholders in full. 7 0 Congress had provided
that "a stock dividend shall not be subject to tax." The court,
however, rejected the Government's contention that this exemption
was intended, in line with Eisner v. Macomber," to exclude only
46those stock dividends which could not constitutionally be taxed, and
held that it exempted all stock dividends from the tax. The taxpayer sold the stock dividend in the year received. The Act established cost as the basis for the computation of gain or loss on the
sale or exchange of property, 72 and as the cost of the preferred stock
to the stockholder in this case was zero, the total proceeds were
taxable.73
It has been suggested 7 that the statute does not distinguish between income which is taxable on -receipt and that which is exempt
on receipt by statute; that in either case, the cost being zero, the
70 A preferred dividend on preferred stock would seem also to be a tax*,%able dividend as it increases the preference to dividends and to share in
the assets of liquidation which the preferred stockholder has over the common. If participating preferred shares are outstanding, a common stock
dividend on common stock apparently constitutes income, as the common
shareholders have acquired a greater right to share in the earnings after
the minimum dividend is paid to the preferred shareholders. In these inNtances, there is actually some change in proportionate interest. No change
would occur, however, if a preferred dividend were paid to common shareholders when no preferred shares were outstanding.
The court in the
Gowran case laid no emphasis on the existence of outstanding preferred
shares, and in Helvering v. Pfeiffer, supra, note 68, disposed of on another
ssue, did not mention whether or not there were such outstanding stock.
It may have considered the point immaterial and the dividend income even
though other preferred shares were not outstanding.
1iSupra, note 68.
72 Revenue Act of 19:28, Secs. i ii (a), 113.
7 In Koshland v. Helvering, supra, note 68, it was held that the Act did
not provide for splitting the basis of the original stock between it and the
dividend stock, so that possibility had to be discarded. The Circuit Court
of Appeals thoukht that the rule applied in the case of tax-free legacies
and gifts, where no basis was provided by statute, should be followed and
concluded that the market value of the dividend on receipt became its basis.
See U. S. Treas. Reg. 45 (1918) Art. 1562; Brewster v. Gage (1q30) 280
U. S. 327. The act, however, now provides a basis in the case of bequests
and gifts, so the analogy cannot be followed.
Furthermore, it provides
that the basis of property, except where specifically provided for, is cost
(Revenue Act of 3q28, Sec. 113). As the dividend cost nothing and had
been income, it could constitutionally be given a zero basis. See (1938)
38 Col. L. Rev. 363, 368.
, 4(1938) 26 Calif. L. Rev. 388; (1938) 5 U. Chi. L. Rev. 512; (1938)
5 1 Harv. L. Rev. 744.
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basis is likewise zero. Thus, under the amendment to Section 115f
made in the Revenue Act of 1936 75 it is possible that a stock
dividend may be taxed as income on receipt and, on the authority
of the Gowran case, the whole proceeds taxed on its sale. The
question has also been raised whether items taxable in the year of
a basis ot
receipt but which escaped taxation will
cost.
With respect to stock dividends from 1932 to 1936, an answer
may be found in Sec. 113 (b) (1) (D), first passed in 1932, which
provides in part as follows: " Proper adjustment in respect of the
property shall in all cases be made in the case of stock . . . for the

0

amount of distributions previously made which, under the law
applicable to the year in which the distribution was made, either
were tax free or were applicable in reduction of basis. . . ."

For

the four years in question, the dividends were tax-free and, accordingly, would reduce the basis of the stock on which the dividend was
paid. A necessary implication of such a result is that the amount
by which the original stock's basis is reduced should become the
basis of the tax-free dividend. The purpose was to treat the dividend as a return of capital and hence to divide the original inv!tment between the two forms by which it is now represented.
That does not answer the problem completely. Where the dividends are taxed on receipt, will they again be taxed? It must be
conceded that there is no specific provision which will ascribe to
these items a basis other than cost. The aim of the income tax
acts, however, is to tax net gain, which would seem to preclude
taxing the same income twice to the same recipient, once on receipt
and again on redefinition. Gain once taxed should not thereafter
be taxed.76 It is probable that some such theory will find expression
Where the item, for some
in an opinion if the issue is raised.
taxation in the year
escaped
exemption
statutory
than
other
reason
of receipt, the outcome is doubtful. Probably the rule of the Gowran
case will be followed and the basis will be cost. \/
75 " A distribution made by a corporation to its shareholders in its stock
or in rights to acquire its stock shall not be treated as a dividend to the
extent that it does not constitute income to the shareholder within the
meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution."
76 Commissioner v. Owens (10935, C. C. A. 10) 78 F. (2d) 768; Haag
(1930) ig B. T. A. 982; Ball (1932) 27 B. T. A. 388.
-

7 See Treasury Decision 3052, 3 Cum. Bull. 38

(Aug. 4, 1920) ; ".

A dividend, paid in stock of another corporation held as a part of the assets
of the corporation paying the dividend, is income to the stockholder at the
time the same is made available for distribution to the full amount of the
then market value of such stock (Peabody v. Eisner, 247 U. 5. 347) ; and
if such stock be subsequently sold by the stockholder, the difference between
its market value at date of receipt and the price for which it is sold is
additional income or loss to him, as the case may be." See John H. Cook,
B.T.A. Docket No. 77140 promulgated Sept. 29, 1938.

-
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In another case, Palmer v. Commissioner,7 8 rights distributed to
stockholders to buy stock in another corporation were held not to
be taxable dividends, even though they had considerable market
value when received,7 9 on the ground that the receipt of an option
does not constitute income. The court quoted the statutory definition of dividend, emphasizing the necessity of a distribution of
money or property which diminishes the corporation's net worth,o
and held that the distribution of pptions to buy its assets was not a
diminution of corporate net worth. 8' Apparently it regards an
option as involving too many contingencies 82 to be considered prop83
It held at the
erty in the contemplation of the income tax law.
78 (937) 58 Sup. Ct. 67. See Comments (1938) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 515;
(1938) 86 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 317; (1937) 47 Yale L. J. 139.
79 On the cash receipts and disbursements basis a dividend becomes income on receipt. On the accrual basis it becomes income on the ex-dividend
date. Sharp v. Commissioner (C. C. A. 2nd 1937) 91 F. (2d) 802, reversed
on another point (1938) 58 Sup. Ct. 748.
test of Eisner v. Macomber, it is not
80 Although this is the "outgo"
inconsistent with the Gowran case, as the former dealt with the nature of
income under the Sixteenth Amendment while the latter deals with the
statutory requirement for a dividend. Since 1936, Sec. 115 (f) has provided that stock dividends shall be excluded from taxable income only where
they do not constitute income under the Sixteenth Amendment. This provision leaves no room for limiting their taxability by an interpretation of
the definition of dividends found in Sec. II5 (a).
81 This holding seems to disregard the plain economic facts in cases
where rights are issued to purchase property at less than its market value.
In such cases there is in every practical sense a decrease in corporate net
worth. The option price is the maximum amount at which the property
subject to the option can be valued as property of the corporation, Helvering v. Salvage (1936) 297 U. S. io6; Wilson v. Bowers (1932) 57 F. (2d)
682; Lomb v. Sugden (C. C. A. 2d, 1936) 82 F. (2d) 166; (See (1936)
36 Ill. L. Rev. 537, 540, note II), and the net worth is decreased by the
difference between that price and the market value. Furthermore, the stockholder has received something of value, separated from his previous interest
in the corporation, represented usually by certificates commonly dealt with
on the exchange as is the stock acquired through them. If, however, these
options were held to be property, a deductible capital loss would result
upon their lapse. See Section 117 (e) (2) of the Revenue Act of 1936,
Sec. 117 (g) (2) of the 1938 Act.
82 See United States v. Safety Car. Heating and Lighting
Co. (1936) 297
U. S. 88.
83 The court followed Helvering v. San Joaquin Fruit & Investment Co.
(1936) 297 U. S. 496, holding that the value of an option owned on March
I, 1913, did not become capital of the taxpayer on that date.
It also held
that the option was not property, which when exercised, was " exchanged "
together with the cash for real property, that the basis of the real property
was not the March I, 1913, value of the option plus the cash, and that
income was not realized on the exercise of the option. Had the option been
property, the taxpayer would have had income upon its exercise or exchange
in an amount equal to the excess of the value of the land over the sum of
the cash plus the March 1, 1913 value of the option. The holding in thik
case is thus inconsistent with any notion that an option is property or an
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same time that income was not realized by the exchange of the
option plus money for the stock, although the value of the property
acquired exceeded the option price. The bargain purchase rule "4
did not apply in the instant case because the value of the stock and
the option prices coinciding on the day the option was created, there
was no intent to distribute earnings.
The case of Heiner v. Mellon 85 provides the first authoritative
decision of the court on two problems concerning the nature of
income. Two partnerships were formed under the law of Pennsylvania to liquidate the inventories of certain distilling companies.
In 1920, both partnerships showed large profits from the sale of
whisky, but Pennsylvania law forbade the distribution of any of
these profits until the deceased partner's capital was returned. The
court first decided that the partners had taxable income each year
even though they had a liquidating business and could not therefore
know for several years whether they would regain their capital and
make profits. In holding that the basis should be apportioned among
the cases of whisky and that the profit on the sale of each was
income,8 the court settled the doubts occasioned by the statement
in Burnct v. Logan,87 that the taxpayer " properly demanded a return

Q

asset, although in the course of its opinion the court said, "The option
itself was property, and doubtless was valuable." See Merhengood Corporation v. Helvering (C. A. D. C. 1937) 89 F. (2d) 972, certiorari deried 58 Sup. Ct. 33, holding that an option to buy stock given as an
inducement to enter a corporation's employ was not property constituting
income on receipt or added to the basis of the stock when exercised. See
Iad'lo thwell v. Commissioner (C. C. A. ioth 1936) 77 F. (2d) 35, Rossheim v. Commissioner (C. C. A. 3rd 1937) 92 F.(2d) 247.
84 Helvering v. Salvage, supra, note 81.
85 (1938) 58 Sup. Ct. 926.
This case also served to clarify certain problems of statutory interpretation in holding that the technical dissolution of
a partnership upon the death of a partner does not affect the liability of the
surviving partners for taxes on their distributive shares of the partnership
income pending final liquidation and distribution. The court specifically
denied the contention that because the partners' interests were capitalized
upon dissolution, no taxable income resulted until the liquidation returned
to the partners the cost of their interest.
A more formidable argument was made that under Pennsylvania laws the
surviving partners became trustees for liquidation and that the income
should therefore be taxed to them as trustees. The court, however, held
that the local law was not controlling and that the term "trustees" as
used in the revenue act did not include the taxpayers who under that act
were more appropriately considered as partners carrying on business.
8 See

also Elmhurst Cemetery Co.

v. Commissioner (1937) 300 U. S.
296 U. S. 289.
taxpayer sold some stock for cash plus

324; Morrissey v. Commissioner (935)
87 (193)

283 U. S. 404.

The

royalties from the operation of a mine. The Commissioner estimated the
yearly yield needed to restore the taxpayer's investment, and claimed that
any excess yearly royalty was income from the sale of the stock. The court
held that the taxpayer could not be held to realize income until her capfital
was restored.
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of her capital investment before assessment of any taxable gain
based on conjecture."
The court next decided that the partners were taxable on their
distributive shares even though Pennsylvania law prohibited distribution of the profits. Such a tax is similar to taxing a shareholder
on his proportionate part of the undistributed profits of the
corporation. 8 8
In another partnership case, Guaranty Trust Co. v. Commissioner,"9 the decedent's returns were filed on a calendar year basis,
although the partnership of which he was a member reported on a
fiscal year basis. The return for the decedent included his share of
the partnership profits for the full fiscal year last ending. The
executor objected, however, to the inclusion of partnership profits
for the portion of its fiscal year closed by decedent's death on the
ground that as income taxation is based on annual accounting
periods income for two periods should not be included in one return.
He contended that section 182 (a) of the 1932 Act supported this
position in providing for the inclusion in a partner's return of partnership profits "for any taxable year of the partnership ending
within his taxable year ", which, he argued, meant " any one taxable
year," thus excluding from taxation a portion of the partnership
profits. The court found no Congressional purpose to relieve business income from taxation in the year distributable to a partner and
held that the partnership profits for both periods were properly
includible in the decedent's final return. It pointed out that Congress has never undertaken to limit the income taxable in any one
year to that derived from the taxpayer's activities occurring in that
or any other single year. It held that the purpose of Section 182
(a) was to make certain that the distributive share of the partnership income included in computing the net income of a partner
" shall be based upon the income of the partnership " distributable
during the partner's taxable year, even though an accounting period
of the partnership may not be wholly within that year and that the
profits accruing to decedent from the two partnership accountings
were taxable in that year even though the accounting periods aggregated more than twelve months.
In 1934 the court held that subsection (a) of Section 115 of the
Revenue Act of 1928, defining " dividend " for income tax purposes
as " any distribution made by a corporation to its shareholders . . .
out of earnings or profits accumulated after February 28, 1913,"
and subsection (b) providing that for income tax purposes all distributions are paid from " the most recently accumulated earnings
or profits ", when construed together, disclosed a legislative purpose
that pre-1913 accumulations shall not be distributed " in such fashion
88 See Helvering v. National Grocery -Co. (1938)
cussed below.
89 (1938)

58 Sup. Ct. 673.

58 Sup. Ct. 932, dis-
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as to permit profits accumulated after that date to escape taxation." 90 This construction was applied in Foster v. U. S.Yx to
thwart an attempt to charge to post-1913 earnings amounts distributed in partial liquidation of the corporation's stock. The court
held that the amounts so distributed were in no part from " the most
recently accumulated earnings" but chargeable to capital, leaving
the post-1913 accumulations intact.
Bogardus v. Commissioner 92 creates new uncertainties regarding
the taxability of bonus payments to employees. Shareholders of
corporation B, formerly shareholders of Corporation A, without any
obligation to do so, voted a bonus to former employees of A in
recognition of their valuable and loyal services to A. Finding that
the payments were made without consideration and to persons who
had never been employed by the disbursing corporation and (as the
parties had stipulated) that the payments were not made or intended
to be made for any services to that corporation, the court held that
they were intended as gifts and not as compensation, the historic
fact of past service simply being a reason for the gift.93 The court's
earlier holding, that if the intention is to compensate more completely for past service the payment is taxable income although made
voluntarily and without a consideration, 9 4 it not repudiated. The
court's reasoning, however, that a payment cannot be both gift and
compensation and the inference that every payment which is in any
aspect a gift is perforce not compensation makes the administrative
determination of the category into which -a bonus payment falls
almost impossible to make. Nor is the test suggested by the dissenting Justices satisfactory. They view the question as one of
fact, to be determined by the trial court, whether the payment is
made to requite more completely for past services' or is made to
show good will, esteem or kindness to persons who have served but
without thought to make a requital for service. Under this test
there may be as many different interpretations as there are courts
to find the facts. A statutory provision that payments made by
reason of past service are compensation regardless of the intention
with which made appears to be the most satisfactory solution.
In framing the Civil War Income Tax Act of 1864 and every7
Revenue Act from 1913 to 193, Congress has struggled with the
problem of preventing the avoidance of taxes on shareholders
through the accumulation of corporate surplus. The expedient of
90 Helvering v. Canfield, Thorsen v. Helvering
91 (1938)
Rev. 207.

58 Sup. Ct. 424.

See comment

(934)

(1938)

291 U. S. 163.

4 U. of Pittsburgh

L.

92 (937)
58 Sup, Ct. 61. See comments, (938)
86 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
315; (1938) 22 Minn. L. Rev. 539, 575; (938)
44 W. Va. L. Q. 151;
(1938) 12 Tulane L. Rev. 473.
3 Justices Brandeis, Stone, Cardozo and Black, dissenting.
4 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner (1929) 279 U. S. 716.
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taxing corporate profits to the shareholders employed in the Act
of 1864 was used in the Revenue Act of 1913 only if the corporation
was formed or availed of for the purpose of preventing the imposition of surtaxes upon its shareholders. Eisner v. Macomber 5
cast doubt upon the validity of this provision and in 1921 the system
was changed to a tax of 25% on the net income of corporations
having the defined purpose. This method with various changes,
particularly in rates, is found in all subsequent Revenue Acts.96
The difficulty of proving the requisite purpose has rendered extremely difficult the application of the section. The surtax on personal holding companies imposed by the Revenue Act of 1934 and
strengthened by the Revenue Act of 1937, avoids this difficulty with
respect to corporations, the greater part of whose income is derived
from investment sources, by eliminating the necessity of proving a
purpose to avoid surtaxes.
The undistributed profits tax imposed by the Revenue Act of 1936
was perhaps the most complete and effective method of solving the
problem. The emasculation of that tax in the Revenue Act of 1938
gives renewed significance to the tax on corporations formed or
availed of for the purpose of preventing the imposition of the surtax
upon its shareholders. The doubts as to the -constitutionality of
this tax that have existed since its inception were finally removed
by the decision in Helvering v. National Grocery Company." The
court held: that the tax in no way limits the powers of the corporation conferred by state law to declare or withhold dividends but
is merely imposed upon corporations using their powers to prevent
imposition of surtaxes upon their shareholders; that the tax was not
laid upon a state of mind but upon net income, the existence of the
defined purpose being a condition precedent to liability; that the
prescribed standard was not t6o vague; that the retroactive assessment involved was not objectionable and that an invalid delegation
of power was not given the commissioner. In holding that the
penal nature of the tax did not render it invalid on the grounds that
the taxpayer, the sole owner of the business, could not by conducting
it as a corporation prevent Congreys from laying on him individually the tax on the year's profits, and by referring to the various
provisions in the Revenue Acts from 1913 through 1937, taxing
shareholders with respect to corporate income, the court clearly indicates that it no longer considers the corporate entity a bar to the
taxation of corporate income to the shareholders.
95 (1920)

252

Wall. (7g U. S.)

U. S. 189, by overruling Collector v. Hubbard (1871)
.

96 See Section 102
9

of the Revenue Act of 1938.

(1938) 58 Sup. Ct.

932.

12

23
CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS

In four cases the scope of the reorganization provisions was considerably limited. In two, Groman v. Commissioner 98 and Helvering v. Bashford,9 9 these provisions were interpreted to apply only
where the securities acquired by a transferor represent a " continuing interest " in the property transferred and not solely an interest
in new or different property.' 00
In the Groman case A Company, pursuant to agreement with the
shareholders of B Company, organized C Company to which it
transferred cash and its preferred stock. The shareholders of B
Company transferred their B Company stock to C Company in
return for C Company's stock, A Company's stock, and cash. It
was admitted that the acquisition of C Company stock was tax-free,
as C Company was a party to a reorganization, and the issue was
whether the acquisition of A Company's stock was tax-free for the
same reason. A Company was not a party to a reorganization as
defined in. Section 112 (i) (2).101 The court held that the definition of reorganization in Section 112 (i) (2) was not intended to
be all inclusive. Under this definition, A Company was not a party
to the reorganization " within the natural meaning of the term,"
but merely the " efficient agent " in promoting the reorganization.
It had been contended that A Company was a party on the ground
that the separate entity of C Company, a mere agent of A Company,
should be disregarded. The court held that A Company stock
received by .the B Company shareholders represented an interest in
new assets and not a continuing interest in the property transferred
and was therefore " other property ", giving rise to taxable gain.
The test was based on the principle that " where, pursuant to a
plan, the interest of the stockholders of a corporation continues to
be definitely represented in substantial measure in a new or different
one, then to the extent, but only to the extent, of that continuity
of interest, the exchange is to be treated as one not giving rise to
present gain or loss."
98

(937)

/

58 Sup. Ct io8.

99 (1938) 58 Sup. Ct. 307.
10o This interpretation appeared in Co rtland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) 6o F. (2d) 937, as an implication of the term

" reorganization ". It was adopted as conclusive by the Supreme Court in
Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner (933)
287 U. S. 462,
holding that short-term notes were equivalent to cash and not "securities ",
as they did not represent a continuing interest in the transferred assets.
See Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Company (1935) 296 U. S. 378, where the
acquisition of common stock of the transferee, John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering (1935) 296 U. S. 374, where the acquisition of preferred stock of the
transferee, and Helvering v. Watts (1935) 296 U. S. 387, where the acquisition of bonds of the transferee, supplied the continuing interest and made
the transactions reorganizations rather than sales of assets.
101 Revenue Act of 1928.

Section 112 (g)

(2) of the 1938 Act.
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In Helvering v. Bashford 102 the court decided that a taxable
gain arose on the sole ground that there had been no continuity of
interest. A Company bought all the stock of B, C. and D corporations, which it transferred to a subsidiary, X Company. The
stockholders of B, C and D received from A Company cash, stock
of X Company and stock of A Company. A Company retained
57% of the common and all of the preferred in X Company, thus
coming within the statutory definition of " a party to a reorganization." 103 The acquisition by A Company of the B, C and D
stock also constituted a reorganization to which under the statutory
definition, A Company was likewise a party.104 Despite the fact
that A Company was therefore a party to two reorganizations, under
the statutory language, the court held that because the shareholders
of B, C and D acquired, by receipt of the A Company stock, only
an interest in new assets (A Company's) and not a continuing
interest in the transferred assets, the A Company stock was " other
property " giving rise to taxable gain, and A Company was not
therefore a party to a reorganization.
The court answered the contention that A Company was a party
to a reorganization as expressly defined in the statute by holding
that as the whole purpose of the reorganization plan was to transfer
the assets of the three reorganized companies to X Company, the
subsidiary of A Company, A Company's ownership of B, C and D
was "transitory and without real substance," and' unnecessary to
the consummation of the plan. Accordingly, there were virtually
no differences from the Groman case, and the rule of that case
applied. 05
02

Supra, note 99.

103 Sec.

112 (i)
(i) - "The
term ' reorganization' means . . . (c) a
transfer by a corporation of all or a part of its assets to another corporation if immediately after the transfer the transferor or its stockholders
(shareholders) or both are in control of the corporation to which the assets
are transferred . . ." Under this definition, a reorganization occurred
when A Company transferred to X Company assets in the form of stock
in three corporations and in return received all the preferred and a majority
of the common shares of X Company.
Section 112 (i) (2) - "The term ' a party to a reorganization ' includes
a corporation resulting from a reorganization and includes both corporations in the case of a reorganization resulting from the acquisition by one
corporation of stock or properties of another." Another provision in the
same section defining reorganization as "including the acquisition by one
corporation of at least a majority of the voting stock and at least a
majority of the total number of all other classes of stock of another corporation." Under these definitions when X Company acquired properties
of A Company, both were parties to a reorganization.
104 Section 112 (i) (I) and (2), supra
note 103.
105 Commissioner v. Kitselman (937)
89 F.(2d) 458, cert. den. (1937)
"8 Sup. Ct. 29, accord without reference, Commissioner v. Newberry Lumber and Chemical Co. (C. C. A. 6th, 1938) 94 F.(2d) 447 seem out of line
with the continuity of interest theory.
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Inthe two other recent corporate reorganization cases,
Minnesota

Tea Co. v. Helvering 106 and U. S. v. Hendler,'0 debts of the corporations were assume ,
te shareholders and by the transferee
corporation, respectively 0
e court held that the assumption of the
obligations gave rise to i come and as it was not distributed to the
shareholders it was not exempted by Sec ion 112 (d) (1) but was
taxable under Section 112 (d) (2).J0
In reorganizations, gain realized on 'the receipt of securities is
not taxed.108 Gain realized on the receipt of money or property
is taxed 109 unless, in the case of a corporation, it is distributed.110
If it is distributed to shareholders, they will be taxed on it.111 If the
money or property is used to pay creditors, any gain the corporation
realized on its receipts will never be taxed. Where the taxation of
a gain cannot be postponed or passed on, as in the instant cases,
the gain should be taxed when realized.112

'

DEPLETION

The nature of a depletable interest in oil and gas wells was
before the court in three -cases. It had previously stated that a taxpayer had a depletable interest if he had an economic interest in the
oil and gas.113 The use of this test led to a great confusion as is
evidenced by the reversal of the Circuit Courts of Appeals in each
of the three cases. Its latest pronouncement that the taxpayer must
have a "capital investment or interest" in the oil or gas in place
and that a mere economic interest is insufficient will probably prove
no less confusing.
In Helvering v. Bankline Oil Company 114 the taxpayer had a
contract entitling him to possession of the oil at the well after it
was pumped to the surface and the right to refine the oil and pay
the owner of the well in kind. He was held not to have a depletable
interest as he had merely a contractual right against the owner of
the oil and no interest therein before it was pumped to the surface.
In Helvering v. O'Donnell,"3 a shareholder in a corporation owning oil wells and producing oil and gas was held not to possess any
depletable interest. Accordingly, when all the shares were sold to
another corporation and the taxpayer received for his share a por58 Sup. Ct. 393.
58 Sup. Ct. 655.
108 Sec. 112 (b) (3) and (4).
106 (1938)
107

(1938)

109 Sec. 112

(c)

(),

(d)

(2).

no0 See II12 (d) (i).
111 Sec. 112 (c) () and (2).
112 See, however, (1938) 38 Columbia L. Rev. 685;
Rev. 203 and 418.
113 Palmer v. Bender (1932) 287 U. S. 551.
114

(1938)

115(T38)

58 Sup. Ct. 616.

58 Sup. Ct. 6 o.

(1938)

24 Va. L.
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tion of the net proceeds from the production of the oil wells, he
did not have the required depletable interest as he acquired no
greater interest in the oil and gas in place after the sale of his
shares than he had before their sale.
In Helvering v. Elbe Oil Land Development Company,116 the
taxpayer had sold the property under an agreement entitling the
purchaser to abandon the property at any time prior to the middle
of the second year, the taxable year in question., The contract
stated that the taxpayer retained no interest in the property although
during these years there was the possibility of a reversion upon
abandonment by the buyer. The purchaser, however, did not
abandon the property. The court, ignoring the possible reversion,
held that the taxpayer had retained an interest in the oil and the
gas in the place, and therefore had no depletable interest.
In another depletion case, Helvering v. Mountain Producer's Corporation,117 the taxpayer, an owner of oil leases, entered into a contract to sell all the oil produced. The purchaser agreed to conduct
all the development and production operations and to pay cash
royalties to the taxpayer. The taxpayer's contention that the development and production costs should be considered gross income
for the purpose of computing the seller's depletion allowance, was
rejected as too theoretical and contrary to the natural sense in which
the term " gross income from property " was employed in the statute.
MISCELLANEOUS
Biddle v. Commissioner 118 held that no credit was permissible
under Section 131 of the Federal Revenue Act of 1928, allowing a
citizen of the United States a credit for income taxes paid to any
foreign country, for the English standard tax on corporate dividends. The English tax is imposed on corporate earnings each
year whether or not dividends are paid. If a dividend is paid, the
tax is considered as part of the gross dividend. Each recipient, of
the dividend includes his pro rata share of the tax in his gross income for English super tax purposes, and if by reason of exemptions or deductions his net income is below a certain figure he can
get a refund from the government of his pro rata share of the tax
paid by the corporation. In England this system is considered as a
payment of the tax by the shareholder. The court applying
American rather than English tests in holding that the corporation
and not the shareholder pays the English tax within the meaning
of Section 131, reasoned that the English tax was similar to our
58 Sup. Ct. 621.
(1938) 58 Sup. Ct. 623.

16 (1938)

See Comment (1938) 16 Texas L. Rev. 6oi.
s18
(938) 58 Sup. Ct. 37. See comments (1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 69i;
(1938) 23 Cornell L. Q. 329; (1938) 86 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 552. See also,
117

Mitchell B. Carroll, International Double Taxation
Magazine 588.

(1938)

16 The Tax
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corporate income tax and that as a shareholder in an American
corporation receives no credit for the corporate tax neither should
a shareholder in British corporations.
Although the Regulations 119 require claims for refund to state
specifically the grounds on which based, claims are sometimes considered notwithstanding they are general. If a general claim is
considered, it may be amended to set forth specific grounds even
though the time for filing refund claims has elapsed. 12 0 If a specific
claim is filed, it may be amended after the expiration of the statutory period if its effect is merely to set forth with greater particularity the grounds set forth in the original claim 121 but not if its
effect is to set forth new and additional grounds for relief.12 2
These rules were applied in U. S. v. Andrews 1 2 3 where the taxpayer
was denied a right to amend his specific claim and in U. S. v.
Garbutt Oil Co.,'2 4 where it was held that the untimeliness of the
amendment was not waived by the Commissioner's consideration of
the merits of the position taken therein.
In two cases, Pacific National Co. v. Welch 125 and U. S. v.
Kaplan 126 the court refused to permit taxpayers to change from the
deferred payment basis to the installment basis after the time for
filing returns had expired but before the expiration of the period
of limitations for claiming refunds. The burdensome uncertainties
in the administration of the revenue acts that would otherwise result
seem clearly to justify making binding an election between methods
of reporting income.
Acquittal of the defendant in a criminal action for "willful
evasion of the revenue laws " was held in Helvering v. Mitchell 127
not to bar recovery of an assessment of the 50% addition to the
deficiency due to fraud, provided in Section 293 of the Revenue Act
of 1928. The court held that the addition was civil and not criminal in nature, and that its purpose was not to punish but to protect
the revenue and to reimburse the government for the heavy expenses
of the investigation and loss resulting from the taxpayers' fraud.
As the burden of proof is greater in criminal than in civil cases,
acquittal in a criminal case is not res judicata in the civil case
even though the facts, issues and parties be the same, and as the
case is civil no question of double jeopardy can arise.
119 Reg. 94, Art. 322-323.
120 U. S. v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co. (1933)

Factors & Finance Co. (1933)
121 Bemis Bros. Bag Co. v.
122 U. S. v. Henry Prentiss
123 (938)
58 Sup. Ct. 315.
124 (1938) 58 Sup. Ct. 320.
125 (1938) 58 Sup. Ct. 857.
126 (1938) 58 Sup. Ct. 859.
127 (1938) 58 Supt. Ct. 63o.

288 U. S. 62; U. S. v.
288 U. S. 89.
U. S. (1933) 289 U. S. 28.
& Co., Inc. (1933) 288 U. S. 73.
See comment, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 935.
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In Phillips-Jones Corporation v. Parmley,12 8 the right of the
shareholder, held liable as a transferee in Phillips v. Commissioner 129 to contribution against other shareholders was upheld.
The transferee's right to contribution arises from the general law
and does not differ from that of any other person who has paid more
than his fair share of a common burden. Accordingly, it was of
no consequence that the Commissioner had made no assessments
against the other shareholders, or that the sections of the Revenue
Act imposing transferee liability made no provision for contribution.
Section 607 of the Federal Revenue Act of 1928 provides that any
payment of a tax after its collection is barred by limitation is an
overpayment and section 609 provides that any credit against a
barred liability is void. In McEachern v. Rose 130 the court was
called upon to decide whether these provisions prevented the government from relying upon a barred deficiency of income tax for the
year of death of a decedent to deny refund of overpayments made
by the administrator of decedent's estate for subsequent years. The
overpayments and deficiency, respectively, resulted from the error of
the administrator in reporting as income for the years following
death, gains from an installment sale which should have been included in income for the year of death. The court, applying the
literal language of the statute, held the overpayments could not be
credited against the barred deficiency and accordingly should be
refunded. The case in itself is of little importance particularly since
a different result will unquestionably be reached in similar situations
under the provisions added by Section 820 of the Revenue Act of
1938 to mitigate the effect of the statute of limitations in cases of
this character. It gains significance, however, when considered in
relation to previous cases on recoupment.
In Bull v. U. S.131 a taxpayer was permitted to apply an overpayment of estate tax, recovery of which was barred, against an
income tax later imposed on the same item as that on which the
estate tax was paid. The decision was based on the application of
equitable principles to prevent the government from unjustly retaining two taxes on the same item. The McEachern case presents an
almost exact converse situation and, admittedly, a contrary result
would have been reached were it not for the specific provisions of
sections 607 and 609. The court's refusal to permit the application
of the overpayments against the barred deficiency must thus be
accepted as a reversal or modification of the statement in Stone v.
White,13 2 decided at the previous term, to the effect that these sec128

(937)

129 (193)
130
131
132

58 Sup. Ct. 197.

See comment (1938)

283 U. S. 589.

(1837) 58 Sup. Ct. 84.
(1935) 295 U. S. 247.
(1937) 301 U. S. 532, 538.

32 Ill. L. Rev. 756.
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tions of the act did not deprive the government of equitable defenses.
The decisions in the two cases, however, are entirely consistent.
In the McEachern case, recovery of the overpayments could be
prevented only by crediting them against the barred deficiency of
the taxpayer for an earlier year, a procedure specifically prohibited
by the statute. In Stone v. White, a different situation existed.
The trustees of a trust sought to recover a tax paid by the trust on
income which should have been taxed to the beneficiary. Since
recovery by the trustees would inure to the benefit of the beneficiary
and would result in income escaping taxation, inasmuch as collection from the beneficiary was barred, the government unquestionably
had an equitable defense unless prohibited by Sections 607 and 609.
Although collection from the beneficiary was barred at the time of
payment by the trust, the trust was not paying the beneficiary's tax
but was paying what it erroneously considered was its own, collection of which was not barred by limitation at the time of payment.
Thus, the overpayment of tax by the trust existed independently of
Section 607 and not by virtue of that section.
Section 609 likewise was not Applicable. Although, equitably
considered, a beneficiary and a trust may have identical interests,
they are separate entities for income tax purposes. Since the only
authority in the Act for the crediting of overpayments 1s contemplates that the credit shall be applied against taxes due from the
taxpayer, Congress in providing in Section 609 that overpayments
shall not be credited against barred liabilities must have had reference to cases where the barred tax and the overpayment both related
to the same taxpayer and not to cases like that of Stone v. White,
where the barred deficiency was owing from one taxpayer and the
barred deficiency was made by another. Hence, although these sections deprive the government of equitable defenses in cases falling
within their provisions, these sections, not being applicable in Stone
v. White, did not preclude reliance on the equities presented therein.
In reaching its decision in McEachern v. Rose, the court had
occasion to consider the actual time when an overpayment was
credited against a deficiency. It concluded that since the credit or
refund was allowed when the commissioner signed the schedule of
overassessments that that was the time when the credit was made.
In such cases the credit is merely a bookkeeping entry. In United
States v. Wurts,134 the court was required to decide if the date of
allowance of the refund, i. e., the signing of the schedule of overassessments, was the date of the making of the refund so that the
statute of limitations on recovery of an erroneous refund would
start to run when the schedule was signed. The court held that a
refund was not " made " at the time it was " allowed." The use of
different terms implies a different meaning, and as the government
133 Sec. 322 (a)
134 (1938)

Revenue Act of 1928.

58 Sup. Ct. 637.
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could not sue to recover an erroneously made refund before it had
sent the money to the taxpayer, the statute of limitations should not
commence to run before the cause of action arose.
THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX

Section 302 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1926 as amended by Joint
Resolution of Congress of March 3, 1931, and Section 803 (a) of
the Revenue Act of 1932, which included in the gross estate of a
decedent property irrevocably transferred with a reservation of a
life estate to the transferor,1 3 5 was interpreted in Hassett v.
Welch 136 to be prospective only in operation, and therefore inapplicable to transfers made prior to March 3, 1931. The constitutionality of its application to transfers made after that date was upheld
in Helvering v. Bullard 137 on the grounds that the purpose of the
legislation was to prevent avoidance of estate taxes and that " Congress having the right to classify gifts of different sorts, might
impose a tax at one rate upon a gift without reservation of a life
estate, and at another rate upon a gift with such reservation." 138
These reasons were repudiated by the court in 1932 in Heiner v.
39
Donnan,1
holding invalid the conclusive presumption in Section
3.02 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1926 that gifts within two years
of the donor's death were made in contemplation of death. The
court's present recognition of Congress's power to classify gifts inter
vivos with transfers at death not only indicates that Heiner v.
Donnan was wrongly decided but goes far in removing the doubts
concerning the validity of proposals to integrate gift and estate
taxes into one tax.1 4 0
Another instance of the special tax advantages given residents of
community property states is found in Lang v. Commissioner,14 ' in
which only one-half of the proceeds of the decedent's policies of
life insurance were held includible in the gross estate as the premiums had been paid with community funds.
Amounts paid to charitable institutions by an executor pursuant
to binding promises of the decedent, where the only consideration
was a stipulated application of the amount received, were held not
1s Adopted to close the loophole left by May v. Heiner (1930) 281 U. S.
238, and the per curiam decisions of March 2, 1931, relying thereon. Burnet
v. Northern Trust Co. (1931) 283 U. S. 782; Morsman v. Burnet (1931)
283 U. S. 783; McCormick v. Burnet (1931) 283 U. S. 784.
136 (1938) 58 Sup. Ct. 559.
137 (938)
58 Sup. Ct. 565.
138 Ibid. at page 567.
139 (1932) 285 U. S. 312. See also Schlesinger v. Wisconsin (1926) 270
U. S. 230.
140See George T. Altman, Combining the Gift and Estate Taxes (1938)

16 Tax Magazine 259.
141 (938) 58 Sup. Ct. 88o.
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in Taft v. Commissioner 142 as "claims . . . incurred
. . for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth ". As such amounts were not testamentary transfers of the
decedent, they were held not deductible as transfers to charitable
institutions.

deductible

FEDERAL

ExcISE

TAXES

14

In White v. Aronson, s the only federal excise tax case reviewed.
during the last term, it was held that jig-saw puzzles are not subject
to tax as " games and parts of games " under Section 609 of the
Revenue Act of 1932.
(1938)

58 Sup. Ct. 891.
(1937) 58 Sup. Ct. 95. The court limited the language of the decision in Baltimore Talking Board Co. v. Miles (C. C. A. 1922) 280 Fed.
658, which held a ouija board a game, and distinguished Mills Novelty Co.
o F.(2d) 476, upholding the tax on a coin-operating
v. U. S. (Ct. Cl. 193)
gambling machine.
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